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Abstract –Security assurance in cloud computing is one 
of the main barriers for wider cloud adoption. Potential 
cloud computing consumers like to know whether the 
controls in cloud environments can adequately protect 
critical assets migrated into the cloud.  We present a 
cloud security audit approach to enable users’ evaluate 
cloud service provider offerings before migration, as 
well as monitoring of events after migration. Our 
approach entails a set of concepts such as actor, goals, 
monitoring, conditions, evidence and assurance to 
support security audit activities. These concepts are 
considered as a language for describing the properties 
necessary for cloud security audit both before and after 
migration. Finally, a real cloud migration use case is 
given to demonstrate the applicability of the security 
audit approach.    
Keywords: Cloud computing; security; audit; 
conditions; and evidence. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud Computing (CC) offers increased agility for 
enterprises to easily expand their IT services as 
business needs evolve, along with significant benefit 
of cost reduction [1]. Cloud Computing Customers 
(CSC) are increasingly apprehensive about cloud 
adoption, with current literatures citing the insufficient 
implementation of appropriate security controls by 
Cloud Service Providers (CSP) and the inability of 
customers to monitor their entities as the  two most 
pressing challenges to adoption. We approach this 
problem from the outlook of a security audit 
perspective, which is perceived as an established 
method for assessment and evaluation process that 
could successfully facilitate cloud migration decision-
making process. Security audit empowers the trail of 
resources, collection and evaluation of evidence to 
determine the effectiveness and efficiency of controls 
in safeguarding assets and achieving organizational 
objectives [2, 11, 13].   
There are approaches from both academia and 
industry that cover cloud security audit from different 
perceptions. Some of such works [3,4] consider the 
task of allowing a third party auditor to verify the 
integrity of dynamic data stored in the cloud on behalf 
of the CSC. Others, such as CloudAudit [5] provide 
an assessment methodology through which the 
offerings of various CSPs are analyzed. However, 
there is insufficient consideration for a systematic 
audit process that uses a set of concepts relevant to 
user-specific goals and cloud based environment. An 
audit should assess the completeness of security 
offerings being provided by a specific CSP that has 
the potential to fulfill users’ requirements. This paper 
contributes towards this direction by introducing a set 
of concepts that support the evaluation of CSP 
offerings. We follow the existing works in literatures 
such as Goal Oriented Requirements Engineering 
(GORE) [6] to define the concepts. The concepts 
enable the definition of users’ intentions as the goals 
for cloud migration, as well as the introduction of 
conditions so that appropriate evidences can be 
collected as a prerequisite for fulfilling conditions and 
cloud adoption. Finally, we implement the concepts in 
a real organization to demonstrate the relevance of the 
work. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Cloud security audit allows users to understand 
security status of CSP’s infrastructure. The National 
IT and Telecom Agency [7] introduced the current 
trends in cloud audit, assurance initiatives and 
evaluated the feasibility of accessing different security 
documentations provided by CSPs to determine 
whether they provide adequate information to meet 
the customers’ risk assessment and be compliant with 
legislative requirements. [8] proposed Complete-
Auditable-Reportable (C.A.RE) approach to help 
prospective CSCs evaluate the sufficiency of security 
services offered by CSPs and map those offerings 
with their internal operational requirements through 
an assessment process. [9] presented Security-Audit-
as-a-Service architecture that uses the concept of 
utilizing autonomous agents for monitoring a cloud 
infrastructure. CSA CloudAudit framework attempted 
to address audit and compliance in cloud services by 
developing an automated and standardized way to 
facilitate information gathering regarding the 
performance and security of cloud services [5]. 
All the above mentioned efforts introduced 
essentially relevant concepts to the realm of auditing 
in CC. However, some of the works are limited to 
specific cloud models and acknowledge the 
difficulties of identifying the control objectives that 
need to be audited in cloud context. There has been a 
little effort made towards building an auditing 
approach that could support users in analyzing the 
security offerings of a CSP based on primary user 
goals. Our work contributes to develop such an 
approach and supports business organizations and 
individuals in identifying goals and sufficiently 
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assesses cloud offerings for a well-founded decision 
making.  
III. MODELLING CONCEPTS 
The proposed approach includes several modeling 
concepts that serve as a language for describing 
essential audit properties.  As stated before, we follow 
GORE approach [6] to define the language and extend 
the methodology with imperative concepts for cloud 
security audit. Furthermore, we also follow the CSA 
cloud control matrix (CCM) [5] to define the audit 
conditions.  An overview of the concepts used by the 
proposed approach is given below: 
a. Actor. An actor represents an entity that has 
strategic goals within its organisational setting (6). 
Based on the layers of CC service models, actors 
are identified as CSPs and CSCs. CSPs develop 
applications that are offered and deployed on the 
CC platform, and also supply infrastructure, 
network facilities and other computing and storage 
services needed to run applications within the 
cloud. CSCs require the services provided by a 
CSP to attain their business goals, hence resort to 
patronising computing services from CSPs.  
b. Goals. A goal represents the overall aims and 
objectives of an actor that support its business 
interests. The CSC is the main actor with three 
goal categories:  
 Strategic goals imply the functionalities or 
services that support a CSC in the attainment 
of business objectives. It entails other sub-
goals. The first sub-goal focuses on 
transforming business models. Organizational 
goal is another type of sub-goal aiming at 
increasing output with efficiency and 
effectiveness. Another sub-goal in this 
category involves cost-reduction defined in 
terms of return on investment (ROI).   
 Operational goals are described as non-
functional properties that are indirectly related 
to functionality, but rather specific to adding 
quality to operating objectives, whose 
attainment moves an organization towards 
achieving strategic goals. Operational goals are 
associated with security, privacy, scalability, 
optimization, and quality of service in the 
cloud.   
 Technical goals deal with ensuring that 
technology adequately provides for the 
technical requirements of the CSC in terms of 
data, application and management 
interoperability, portability and compatibility. 
c. Risks. A risk is defined as the probable failure of 
CSP offerings to fulfil goals, or the probability of 
CSP offerings to obstruct CSC goals. CSPs 
usually design SLAs to satisfy the generic 
requirements of the cloud market, some specific 
requirements that are distinctive to a CSC may not 
be satisfied by the CSP, hence introducing risks to 
their goals. For instance, Office 365 usually allows 
negotiation of goals through SLAs [12]. 
Therefore, risk mitigation actions cover 
performing a trade-off between CSC goals and the 
limitations of the CSP through negotiations that 
are later included as part of the conditions. The 
negotiations can either be direct or indirect. Direct 
negotiation involves unmediated discourse 
between CSC and the CSP. Indirect negotiation 
involves using readily available information to 
assess the service provisions of a CSP. 
d. Conditions. A condition represents a set of 
restrictions that prevent specific CSC goals from 
being achieved unless they are otherwise 
fulfilled. Aspects of a condition deal with setting 
essential specifications for ensuring that all 
specified goals are met; risks mitigated; and the 
continuous monitoring or auditing of migrated 
entities is supported by the CSP. We follow 
CSA’s CCM [5] domains to define the necessary 
conditions. For instance, the domain “Information 
Security – Encryption” in CCM is used to draw a 
condition associated with end-to-end encryption 
for ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of 
CSC entities.  
e. Evidence. An evidence is defined as a set of 
information in any form that represents CSP 
processes, technologies, and operations. The CSP 
generates evidence(s) as a means of 
demonstrating how conditions are approached. 
This is based on a well justified affirmation that 
desired resources, controls and technologies are 
sufficiently implemented. From the perspective of 
our approach, evidence is characterised by 
evidence criteria and evidence source.  
 Evidence criteria deals with controls in 
certain areas specified in the condition, 
which are related to the domains of CCM 
such as data security & information lifecycle 
management.  
 The available information documenting CSP 
service provisions are generated through such 
sources as: audit reports, SLA, benchmarks 
(e.g. CSA CloudAudit), observations, and 
third-party asserted certifications, etc.  
f. Monitoring. Monitoring is defined as recording of 
events to observe the status of migrated objects 
within the CSP infrastructure. It consolidates 
several services that enable CSCs to continually 
monitor and validate the status of security 
controls of a CSP after migration to the cloud. 
Particularly, the monitoring focuses on essential 
areas of cloud operations as (i) security 
operations and processes, and (ii) alerts on 
security incidents, and breach of privacy to 
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entities. The objective of the monitoring concept 
is to ensure that a set of mechanisms, systems, 
processes and procedures are deployed in the CC 
platform to enable CSCs instant reaction to 
unwarranted changes or events concerning their 
entities. 
g. Assurance. Assurance provides various levels of 
confidence regarding CSPs ability to fulfil goals. 
It establishes to what degree a potential CSP’s 
offerings satisfy goals. The ranking is considered 
to be based on a subjective opinion of an auditor 
and other CSC stakeholders. In our approach, the 
assurance is directly defined and represented 
according to a scale ranking of three levels:  
 Level 1. This is the lowest level of assurance 
attributed to a CSP. It indicates all, or rather, 
most evidence(s) required for satisfying 
conditions have not been implemented by a 
CSP, meaning that services are unreliable 
and untrustworthy for adoption. 
 Level 2. The evidences required for fulfilling 
a condition have been moderately or partially 
implemented to a reasonable degree of 
satisfaction. This level manifests that CSP 
offerings are moderately acceptable and 
sustainable.  
 Level 3. This is the highest level of assurance 
signifying that all evidences required for 
fulfilling conditions have been optimally 
implemented with detailed description of 
applicability. It implies that CSP services are 
highly trustworthy, reliable and stable.  
The metamodel illustrated in Fig.1 shows an 
overall relationship among the concepts. A CSC actor 
is represented as having interest in cloud services 
offered by a CSP. The CSP provides reliable and 
secure services that also support its users to 
continually monitor their entities. The CSC may have 
several goals under multiple categories (such as 
security and privacy, availability, cost reduction, etc.), 
and a single or more goals may be the focus of 
attainment. While concerns are raised regarding risks 
that may obstruct the fulfillment of goals in CC 
adoption, how the CSP can fulfill goals, and those 
risks inherent to CC, conditions for migration are 
introduced in order to accredit CSP services and 
mitigate the risks. Conditions represent a description 
of requirements that need to be fulfilled for certain 
occurrences to take place. The conditions are drawn 
from control objectives of CCM particularly on the 
criteria most relevant to the goal(s), and then they are 
imposed to the CSP in order for them to provide 
evidence that fulfill those conditions. Evidence is 
provided by the CSP as a means of demonstrating the 
fulfillment of the conditions. It is done through 
affirmation of the specific criteria relevant to the 
conditions and substantiating the sources from which 
information is provided. The evidence also affirms 
whether security monitoring and incident reporting 
tools are adequately supported. The validity and 
efficacy of the evidences generate different levels of 
assurance to signify the level of satisfaction 
attributable for the each evidence. All of the assurance 
levels serve to indicate that the CSP has implemented 
the necessary technical and nontechnical processes, 
procedures, technologies, and practices that could 




















































Fig. 1 Metamodel 
IV. CASE STUDY 
This section presents a case study from a real cloud 
migration use case to demonstrate the applicability of 
the proposed approach. 
A.Use Case Scenario  
The migration use case adopts a London based 
open-access publishing company. Due to 
confidentiality reasons, we are restrained from using 
the publisher’s real name and detailed information. 
The organization provides an affordable open access 
publishing services of peer-reviewed academic 
journals, books and data through a network of 
independent university and society presses. The 
publishing services provided by the company include 
anti-plagiarism checking, rigorous peer review, 
indexing and archiving.  
The underlying technology for the open access 
publication is using a code repository with Python and 
PH for storing and archiving documents. The code 
repository is currently used by 25 users. The business 
process includes: receiving articles from potential 
researchers, assigning reviewers for the papers, proof 
reading of the selected papers and final publication. 
The existing in-house systems use three web servers, 
and 20Mbps of bandwidth. Generally, there are 
around thousands of articles published every month.  
The company has recently decided to adopt cloud for 
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performing existing operations within tight budget 
constraints. However, the management likes to know 
the possible consequences of cloud adoption in terms 
of benefits and risks, the selection of a suitable CSP 
and evaluating their commitments to protecting the 
interests of the company. One of the coauthors, 
through his personal contact, has the opportunity to 
perform this task based on the proposed approach. 
B. Implementation of the Concepts 
Actor 
The printing company is identified as the CSC 
actor that requires the services provided by a CSP to 
achieve its goals. Another actor is the CSP who 
specializes in the delivery of cloud models and 
provisioning of other computing power that could 
support the company to achieve its goals. 
Goals 
The management certainly has a set of targets as 
goals that must be achieved if the migration ever takes 
place.  These goals are classified according to the 
three categories of sub-goals. Due to space 
restrictions, we are not considering all the identified 
goals for further illustration. In particular, we focus 
only on integrity, availability, and portability goals.  
 Strategic goals. Supporting 24 users to work with 
the code and printing services (organizational 
goal); cost minimization to achieve cost efficiency 
and business sustainability (cost reduction goal). 
 Operational goals. High availability of cloud 
services, continuous and constant customer service 
support, and minimum downtime (availability 
goal); integrity of migrated data and applications 
(integrity goal); the transparency of operations 
and monitoring of migrated entities (auditability 
goal).  
 Technical goals. The portability of supporting 
unlimited number of researchers to access 
published articles through diverse platforms 
(portability goal); running the repository from the 
cloud environment (interoperability); and 
compatibility of cloud-enabled code repository to 
host PHP and Python (compatibility goal).   
Risks 
The predictable and undesirable circumstances that 
could forestall attaining the goals of the company are:  
 Security issues associated with the integrity of 
articles and the code repository in general, such as 
data breaches, loss and leakage. 
 Unavailability of the code repository and open 
access portal.  
 Poor provisioning of customer support by a CSP. 
 Lack of monitoring facilities. 
 
The imperative controls and techniques that are 
desirable in mitigating those risks were discerned and 




To satisfy the identified goals, CSA’s CCM control 
objectives were considered. The domains most 
relevant to ensuring availability, integrity and 
portability in CC were analyzed, interpreted and 
translated into conditions that best befit the goals. 
This means that the conditions aim at ensuring that 
the prospective CSP satisfies all the goals of the 
printing company in line with CCM provisions. Table 
1 shows the identified conditions needed to satisfy the 
goals.       
TABLE I. GOALS AND CONDITIONS 
Goals Conditions (C)  
Availability 
goals 
C1.Availability monitoring & management tools.  
C2.BCP & DRP, data backup & redundancy.  
C3. Customer service support.  
Integrity 
goals 
C4. End-to-end data encryption techniques. 
C5. Access controls integrating identity & access 
management.    
C6. Certifications & third party attestations.  
Portability 
goal 
C7. Compatibility, portability and 
interoperability of data and platforms.    
 
Evidence  
In collecting evidences, the service offerings of two 
reputable IaaS providers were considered from 
sources of information such as CSP websites, security 
whitepapers, Request for Information (RfI). We also 
looked at independent auditor reports to obtain an 
elaborate overview of all the implemented controls, 
processes, procedures and technologies in the CSPs 
environment. Evidences are mapped to the conditions 
accordingly as shown in Table 2, which forms the 
basis to perform an audit and establish a reasonable 
opinion on assurance ranking. For example, 
encryption mechanisms that ensure the integrity of 
published articles was introduced as condition 4 (C4). 
Both CSPs provided evidences in their security 
whitepapers and websites on the implementation of 
encryption techniques at several layers of their 
platform using globally accepted encryption 
standards. In this paper, nevertheless, we do not 
intend to provide a detailed insight into how the audit 
process is applied to the collected evidences as our 
focus is on the introduction of preliminary stages of 
the systematic audit.  
TABLE II. CSPs EVIDENCES 
C CSP ‘A’ Evidences CSP ‘B’ Evidences 
C1 Hardware & software 
monitoring tools for 
 Dedicated monitoring 






services for failure. 
 Automatic service 
availability and recovery 
systems in case of system 
failure.  
C2  BCP & DRP services and 
policies for fast recovery 
of critical IT systems.  
 Automated backup 
methods. 
 Redundancy on multiple 
devices across multiple 
locations. 
 BCP & DRP services and 
policies across all data 
centres in multiple 
locations.  
 Entities stored in a 
redundant environment 
with robust backup, 
restore, and failover 
capabilities for ensuring 
availability 
C3  Web service support for 
technical or account 
issues.  
 Additional support 
features provided using 
voice calls, user guide, and 
knowledge centres.  
 Customer support services 
provided to users through 
online help, community 
forums, online requests, 
and voice call supports,  
C4  An integrated server-side 
encryption for data-at-rest 
is used to store data in 
encrypted form.  
 Users are also encouraged 
to encrypt data at rest, and 
in transit over the network.  
 Keys are stored in separate 
locations from the data for 
enhanced key 
management.  
 Industry cryptographic 
standards such as 
SSL/TLS are used to 
protect data integrity.  
 For further data protection, 
an encryption mechanism 
using AED is deployed on 
servers that hold 
messaging data including 
emails and IM 
conversations.  
C5  Identity & access control 
management that allow the 
creation and management 
of multiple users based on 
credentials & permissions.  
 A multi factor 
authentication is also 
supported as an additional 
layer of security for 
accessing data & 
applications.   
 Data and services are 
secured using identity & 
access control 
management at the data 
center, network, logical, 
storage and transit levels.  
 Azure Active Directory is 
used as the underlying 
identity platform.  
Federated identity and 
single sign-on security 
provided.   
C6 Third party audits and 
certifications issued by: 
ISO27001, ISO27018, Safe 
Harbor, SSAE16, SOC1 
Type II, SOC2 Type II, 
and FISMA 
Certified against third 
party attentions as: 
FEdRAMP, FIPS 140-2, 
FISMA & DIACAP, 
HIPAA, ISO 8001, 
ISO27001, ITAR, PCI-
DSS Level 1, SOC1-3, 
CSA’s CAIQ, and MPAA 
C7 Support standards as OGF, 
CDMI, OCC, OData, 
DMTF,  
Support OGF, CDMI, 
OCC, OData, and DMTF 
formats 
Monitoring 
As a means of ensuring continuous monitoring of 
research data and code repository by the printing 
company, the two CSPs enable a significant number 
of events monitoring techniques in different areas of 
their services that allow CSCs to monitor resources 
and applications after migration. One of such 
technique involves regular penetration testing and 
vulnerability assessments against their services as part 
of a move to mitigate evolving threats and new attack 
patterns, and also on the protection of customer data. 
Another process adopted involves incident response 
process and forensic investigations on recorded 
security incidents. This is demonstrated in the 
evidences. Our analysis in this regard looks into the 
techniques for monitoring security operations and 
processes, and receiving alerts on security incidents 
and breach of privacy to entities as acclaimed by the 
CSPs. However, CSP ‘B’ offers an infrastructure 
monitoring capability with additional features and 
flexibilities that monitors the internal working of 
servers, which checks for information such as security 
status, system availability and performance, and 
network usage. It also offers notification flexibilities 
of defining rules and specifying how and to whom 
message is sent when an alarm is triggered.  
Assurance 
The evidences provided by the CSPs were used to 
determine the level of assurance(s) that can be 
assigned to the ability of their offerings to satisfy the 
goals. In determining assurance level, each evidence 
is compared against the assurance levels defined in 
the previous section. For instance, condition 3 (C3) 
requires a customer service support. CSP ‘A’ fulfilled 
the condition by generating evidences manifesting the 
implementation of a web-enabled customer service 
that support users with technical and account related 
issues. It also provides additional support features 
using voice calls, user guide, and knowledge centers. 
This evidence is ranked with a ‘Level 3’ assurance 
because CSP ‘A’ has a running customer service 
support that is rendered through various platforms to 
adequately meet the printing company’s requests 
when the need arises.  The same process of ranking is 
applied to all of the evidences. The table below 
provides assurance ranking for the respective CSPs.  
 
TABLE III. ASSURANCE RANKING  
Condition 
ID 
CSP ’A’ ASSURANCE 
LEVEL 
CSP ‘B’ ASSURANCE 
LEVEL  
C1 Level 2 Level 3  
C2 Level 3 Level 3 
C3 Level 3 Level 3 
C4 Level 3 Level 3  
C5 Level 3 Level 3  
C6 Level 2 Level 3 
C7 Level 3 Level 2 
Assurance table III illustrates the various level of 
assurances accorded to the CSPs. Both CSPs 
adequately implement and demonstrated evidences to 
fulfill conditions. This may be due to the fact that we 
selected two market leading and reputable CSPs. The 
choice of selection in such scenario remains with the 
management involved. However, in consideration of 
the additional monitoring capabilities supported by 
CSP ‘B’, we see it as more suitable for adoption.      
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C. Discussion  
A brief description of the use case scenario allows 
us to exemplify the implementation of the security 
audit approach. We particularly focused on the 
applicability of the concepts, while referring to 
existing CSP offerings. The main contribution of the 
approach is to support potential cloud users to 
perform a comprehensive investigation of CSP 
offerings based on goals and conditions. In other 
words, it allows users to define specific goals and 
introduce conditions in relation to the goals in order 
for prospective CSPs to exhibit the design and 
strategy in their environments that fulfill user 
expectations. Furthermore, our work also allows users 
to closely examine the existence of tools in CSP 
environment that allows them to continuously monitor 
security events regarding their entities particularly for 
internal security and compliance purposes. The case 
study results revealed that there are adequate 
evidences from two chosen CSPs to support the goals 
and conditions of the studied company. Therefore, in 
most cases assurance is designated at level 3. 
However, CSP B provides enhanced infrastructure 
monitoring capabilities as an additional feature to the 
users that support monitoring after migration. We 
communicated the studied results to the top 
management of the company and studying the results, 
the organization planned to migrate into CSP B.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Cloud computing is increasingly assuming a 
prominent and leading role in businesses for the 
purpose of operational efficiency and cost reduction. 
In spite of the numerous benefits, users remain 
anxious about data protection and dependency on CSP 
for business continuity. We proposed a security audit 
approach to evaluate offerings of CSPs based on user 
needs. The approach takes the viewpoint of cloud 
adoption use case that defines user goals and 
identifies risks that may likely obstruct the fulfillment 
of such goals. And based on the goals, conditions 
(extracted from industry accepted guidelines) are 
introduced that must be satisfied before cloud services 
are purchased. Evidences are then collected from 
CSPs for evaluation and determining the level of 
assurance that can be assigned to CSP services so that 
users can feel confident with the migration decision 
and their ability to monitor their data and applications 
after migration. The approach also defines an 
assurance ranking scheme through which collected 
evidences are compared to a predefined criteria for 
establishing the strength of CSP environment using 
the evidences they have provided. Therefore, the 
underlying concepts by this work allow the user to 
audit the CSP even before migration decisions are 
taken. A real-world case study adopted for this 
approach has shown that the concepts adequately 
support users to asses CSP offerings. The results 
generated from the use case also provided a timely 
support to the management in taking the migration 
decision and advised on the issues that need adequate 
attention. It also demonstrates determining the 
stability, trustworthiness and capability of CSPs. 
However, the paper did not provide details on how to 
execute the audit process, hence we need to provide 
guidelines to users on how the concepts should be 
used in performing the audit. Therefore, we are 
planning to develop a systematic process along with 
guidelines using these concepts to support users with 
the audit. Furthermore, we also intend to implement 
our approach to a different case study to generalize 
findings and refinement of the work.        
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